ΝΑ Πως δουλεύει η κυβερνητική φίμωση. Έκανα το ακόλουθο σχόλιο στη σελίδα του πρωθυπουργού και μετά από 10΄ και εξαφανίστηκε και δεν μπορούσα να κάνω πλέον σχόλια, δεν έχω ξαναδεί τόσο γρήγορη λογοκρισία, η οποία είναι απόδειξη ότι η αλήθεια πονάει πολύ.
”Germany’s prewar debt amounted to 22.6 bn marks including interest. Its postwar debt was estimated at 16.2 bn. In the agreement signed in London on 27 February 1953 these sums were reduced to 7.5 bn and 7 bn respectively. |6| This amounts to a 62.6 % reduction.
The agreement set up the possibility to suspend payments and renegotiate conditions in the event
that a substantial change limiting the availability of resources should occur. |7|
To make sure that the West German economy was effectively doing well and represented a stable key element in the Atlantic bloc against the Eastern bloc, allied creditors granted the indebted German authorities and companies major concessions that far exceeded debt relief. The starting point was that Germany had to be able to pay everything back while maintaining a high level of growth and improving the living standards of its population. They had to pay back without getting poorer. To achieve this creditors accepted first, that Germany pay its debt in its national currency, second, that Germany reduce importations (it could manufacture at home those goods that were formerly imported), |8| third, that it sell its manufactured goods abroad so as to achieve a positive trade balance. These various concessions were set down in the above-mentioned declaration. |9|
Another significant aspect was that the debt service depended on how much the German economy could afford to pay, taking the country’s reconstruction and the export revenues into account. The debt service/export revenue ratio was not to exceed 5%. This meant that West Germany was not to use more than one twentieth of its export revenues to pay its debt. In fact it never used more than 4.2% (except once in 1959).
Another exceptional measure was that interest rates were substantially reduced (between 0 and 5%).
Finally we have to consider the dollars the United States gave to West Germany: USD 1,173.7 million as part of the Marshall Plan from 3 April 1948 to 30 June 1952 with at least 200 million added from 1954 to 1961, mainly via USAID.
Thanks to such exceptional conditions Germany had redeemed its debt by 1960. In record time. It even anticipated on maturity dates.
Some elements towards a comparison
It is enlightening to compare the way post-war West Germany was treated with the treatment of developing countries today. Although bruised by war, Germany was economically stronger than most developing countries. Yet it received in 1953 what is currently denied to developing countries.
Proportion of export revenues devoted to paying back the debt
Germany was allowed not to spend more than 5% of its export revenues to pay back its debt.
In 2004 developing countries had to spend an average of 12.5% of their export revenues to pay back their debts (8.7% for subsaharian African countries and 20% for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean). The proportion was even higher than 20% by the end of the 1990s.
Interest rate on external debt
As stipulated in the 1953 agreement about Germany’s debt the interest rate was between 0 and 5%.
By contrast, the interest rates to be paid by developing countries was much higher. A large majority of agreement had rates that could be increased.
From 1980 to 2000 the average interest rate for developing countries fluctuated between 4.8 and 9.1% (between 5.7 and 11.4% for Latin America and the Caribbean, and even between 6.6 and 11.9% for Brazil from 1980 to 2004).
Currency in which the external debt had to be paid
Germany was allowed to use its national currency.
No third world country can do the same except in exceptional cases for ludicrously small sums. All major indebted countries must use strong currencies (dollars, euros, yens, Swiss francs, pounds sterling).
Possibility of revising the agreement
The London Debt Agreement set up the possibility to suspend payments and renegotiate conditions in the event that a substantial change should curtail available resources.
Loan agreements with developing countries do not include such possibility.
Policy of import substitution
The London Debt Agreement stipulated that Germany could manufacture commodities it used to import.
By contrast the WB and the IMF prohibit developing countries from manufacturing anything they can import.
Cash grants in strong currencies
Although it was largely responsible for the Second World War Germany received significant grants in strong currencies as part of the Marshall plan and beyond.
While the rich countries have promised developing countries assistance and cooperation, the latter merely receive a trickle by way of currency grants. Whereas they collectively pay back some 300 bn US dollars a year, they receive about 30 bn. The largest indebted countries in the Third World receive no cash aid whatsoever.
Undoubtedly the refusal to grant indebted developing countries the same kind of concessions as to Germany indicates that creditors do not really want these countries to get rid of their debts. Creditors consider that it is in their better interest to maintain developing countries in a permanent state of indebtedness so as to draw maximum revenues in the form of debt reimbursement, but also to enforce policies that serve their interests and to make sure that they remain loyal partners within the international institutions.
Αυτοί που κατέστρεψαν την Ευρώπη 2 φορές πέτυχαν την καλύτερη συμφωνία για το τεράστιο χρέος τους ΕΣΕΙΣ ΤΙ?? μα φυσικά την χειρότερη……………””